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Hostile environments, climate justice, and the politics of the lifeboat 
MATTHEW WHITTLE 
 
Environmental breakdown has fast become a major driver of domestic and global migration, 
with the International Organization for Migration reporting that, by the mid-1990s, the number 
of ‘environmental refugees’ had surpassed ‘all documented refugees from war and political 
persecution put together’.1 According to their conservative forecasts, the increased severity of 
floods, storms, desertification, and coastal erosion may lead to the displacement of between 
twenty-five million and two-hundred million people by the year 2050. It is for this reason that 
migration and ecological crises need to be addressed together. One means of achieving this is 
to examine the most common analogy to emerge in critical and creative responses to the 
relationship between climate breakdown and global mobility -- that of individual nation-states 
as lifeboats.  
The different ways in which the lifeboat analogy is framed reveals a conflicting set of 
ideologies relating to the connections between ecological and refugee crises. In the following 
sections, I will identify the three most prevalent uses of the symbolism of the lifeboat. The first 
and most dominant is what I term ‘lifeboat-nationalism’, which mobilizes a vision of 
overpopulated lifeboat-nations as a means of promoting an interconnected set of policies based 
on nationalist isolationism and reproduction controls. The second, drawing on Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s work, can be called the ‘no lifeboats’ position, which optimistically predicts that 
deepening ecological crises will spur a new sense of global solidarity. Lastly, Christian Parenti 
has warned of the politics of the ‘armed lifeboat’, predicting that climate breakdown will 
exacerbate existing forms of ethnonationalism and underpin the increased militarization of 
national and continental borders by the wealthy nations of the Global North.  
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Mapping these positions enables an interrogation of two interrelated, geopolitical 
responses to environmental breakdown: firstly, the widespread denial of/complacency about 
climate change by the very nations of the Global North most responsible, and secondly, the 
strengthening by those same countries of their borders in response to climate crisis-induced 
migration. I will show how one necessary future direction of Postcolonial Studies involves the 
reengagement with long-standing concerns relating to global migration as a central 
preoccupation of the more recent ‘ecocritcal turn’. Drawing these strands of inquiry together 
enables a productive examination of the confluence between reactionary ‘hostile environment’ 
foreign and domestic policies and the increasing environmental hostility to life due to 
anthropogenic climate breakdown.2  
To demonstrate this, I will analyse the ways in which John Lanchester’s The Wall 
(2019) and Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book (2013) reveal how dystopian fiction is able to both 
stage, satirize, and confront the stark premises of the lifeboat analogies formulated by 
ecologists, historians, and economic theorists. Where Lanchester depicts migration from 
outside Britain’s borders and a partial return to oil use in a flooded, warming world, however, 
Wright focuses on both international and domestic migration alongside the history of 
Indigenous dispossession within wealthy nation-states. And while both dystopias challenge the 
socio-economic structures that are actively making the environment more hostile to life, The 
Swan Book goes further by inviting us to envision ecologically sound and just futures founded 
on human and more-than-human kinship. Placing Wright’s depiction of the confluent 
experiences of environmental refugees and Aboriginal Australians in dialogue with the 
perspectives of Native American (specifically Potawatomi) scholars, Kyle Whyte and Robin 
Wall Kimmerer, demonstrates how debates about mobility, climate catastrophe, and 
interspecies relations need to be informed by Indigenous science and storytelling.3 
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The politics of the lifeboat 
‘Lifeboat-nationalism’ is characterized by an isolationist and eugenicist rhetoric whereby the 
analogy assumes a Malthusian vision of the ‘carrying capacity’ of individual nations. The roots 
of this response to ecological breakdown lie in Garrett Hardin’s now infamous article, ‘Living 
on a Lifeboat’ (1974), which assesses global policies devised to combat famine from a post-
war American perspective. Here, Hardin states that the disparities between wealthy and poor 
nations ‘are created by poor countries that are governed by rulers insufficiently wise and 
powerful’, rather than viewing them as a legacy of colonial exploitation and under-
development.4 He therefore regards the pro-immigration and international aid initiatives of 
wealthy nations as a ‘suicidal’ response to the ‘anguishing problems’ of poverty and hunger.5 
In setting out a justification for American isolationism, Hardin uses the imagery of the lifeboat 
in the following terms:  
 
Metaphorically, each rich nation amounts to a lifeboat full of comparatively rich 
people. The poor of the world are in other, much more crowded lifeboats. 
Continuously, so to speak, the poor fall out of their lifeboats and swim for a while 
in the water outside, hoping to be admitted to a rich lifeboat, or in some other way 
to benefit from the ‘goodies’ on board. What should the passengers on a rich 
lifeboat do?6 
 
In answering this question, he argues for restrictions on mobility, democratic freedoms, and 
reproductive rights. Wealthy countries, he writes, should only admit ‘political refugees’ and 
‘men and women of unusual talents’, while also limiting the ‘usual democratic franchise’ to 
avoid ‘political instability’.7 He says that ‘a world government that is sovereign in reproductive 
matters’ is needed to curtail what he describes as ‘the rapidly-breeding poor’.8 This stance 
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recirculates the view, espoused in his earlier article, ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968), that the 
‘only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing 
the freedom to breed’.9 
In the twenty-first century, Hardin’s lifeboat-nationalism has found a renewed audience 
of ecofascists where the analogy is used to further justify the policing of human rights and 
liberties. For the reactionary Finnish ecologist, Pentti Linkola, for instance, environmental 
catastrophe has been caused not by a rapacious and underregulated fossil fuel industry, but by 
the ‘ever-increasing, mindless over-valuation’ of human life.10 Repurposing Hardin’s rhetoric, 
Linkola asks: 
 
What to do when a ship carrying a hundred passengers has suddenly capsized and 
only one lifeboat is available for ten people in the water? When the lifeboat is full, 
those who hate life will try to pull more people onto it, thus drowning everyone. 
Those who love and respect life will instead grab an axe and sever the hands 
clinging to the gunwales.11 
 
Revealing how a Malthusian concern with overpopulation can underpin a chilling return to 
eugenicist thought, this shockingly brutal imagery informs Linkola’s call for an end to the 
‘[e]mphasis on the inalienable right to life of foetuses, premature infants and the brain-dead’.12 
Alongside its abhorrent conclusions, just one of the major flaws in this evocation of the lifeboat 
is that it assumes an equivalence between nation-states and the implied democratic and equally 
distributed precariousness of life on the boat: for this imagined scenario to have any 
intellectual, let alone ethical, credibility the capsized passengers would all need to have equal 
access to both the lifeboat and the axe. And yet, we know that this is not the case in terms of 
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the socio-economic relations within and between nations in the post-colonial era of late 
capitalism.  
As well as informing an ecofascist commitment to eugenics, lifeboat-nationalism has re-
emerged in more mainstream proposals for adapting to the conditions of climate catastrophe, 
most notably in The Vanishing Face of Gaia (2009) by the influential British environmental 
scientist, James Lovelock. Lovelock gained prominence in 1974 after formulating the Gaia 
hypothesis, which views the earth as a self-regulating eco-system. Yet, despite popularizing a 
transnational and holistic ecological vision, Lovelock’s recent work espouses a politics of 
isolationism in response to what he predicts will be a ‘great clamour from climate refugees’.13 
For Lovelock, ecological breakdown is now inevitable and he envisions a future of temperate 
‘lifeboat islands’, such as Britain and New Zealand, and habitable ‘continental oases’, such as 
the northernmost regions of Canada, Scandinavia, and Siberia. On this basis, he argues that 
there is little point mobilizing for preventive policies, dismantling the carbon economy, or 
developing renewable energy initiatives, which he deems to be ‘impractical and expensive’.14 
Instead, Lovelock asserts that humanity must ‘face the appalling question of whom we can let 
aboard the lifeboats? And whom must we reject?’15 The deeply troubling conclusion at which 
he arrives is a combination of isolationism and evolutionary fate. ‘[O]ur leaders’, he asserts, 
should act ‘out of selfish national interest’ and see themselves as ‘captains of the lifeboats that 
their nations might become’.16 In time, Gaia’s ‘metabolic needs’ will choose the ‘million or so 
humans’ it requires for ‘the recycling of life’s constituent elements’.17 While Lovelock rejects 
the idea of ‘planned selection’ by humans in favour of selection by Gaia, he nevertheless echoes 
the eugenicist ethos of Hardin and Linkola when he imagines the future survivors of climate 
catastrophe to be ‘strong in mind and body, whose fitness pays the price of the voyage’.18 Those 
who perish will simply be of a weaker, less fortunate order of humanity, and their deaths will 
be a necessary stage in the evolutionary march of human life. 
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Lovelock’s fatalist position focuses purely on an ecological understanding of the world, 
which leads to his callous investment in isolationism and natural selection as the only possible 
means of preventing outright human extinction. The lifeboat-nationalist position – that humans 
should adapt to the worst extremes of climate catastrophe by what amounts to genocide, 
reenforced national borders, and/or the policing of reproductive rights – is confronted 
elsewhere with perspectives that recognize how, under capitalism, survival is determined by 
the inequitable distribution of wealth and resources. As Raj Patel and Jason W. Moore state: 
‘We may all be in the same boat when it comes to climate change, but most of us are in 
steerage.’19 In her rebuttal of the insistence that each nation-state has a limited ‘carrying 
capacity’, Meehan Crist contends that ‘it isn’t just the total number of humans that matters, but 
the way humans organise to use the available resources’.20 Where the lifeboat analogy is 
adopted to interrogate the confluences between ecological breakdown and global capitalism it 
has informed both the ‘no lifeboats’ and the ‘armed lifeboats’ positions; the former predicts 
that climate change will level existing socio-economic inequalities, while the latter sees climate 
change as exacerbating them.  
The first position is evident in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s article ‘The Climate of History: 
Four Theses’. In this influential essay, Chakrabarty acknowledges that climate change ‘will no 
doubt accentuate the logic of inequality that runs through the rule of capital’, yet he is also 
insistent that ‘Unlike in the crises of capitalism, there are no lifeboats here for the rich and the 
privileged.’21 For Chakrabarty, ecological collapse will act as a great leveller. It may well have 
been forged by the fires of capitalist-imperial expansion and industrialisation, but its effects 
will ultimately beseech us to think in terms of a collective human species; rather than resort to 
competition between classes or nation-states, it points us intellectually to ‘a universal that arises 
from a shared sense of catastrophe’.22 One of the most vocal dissenting views of this position 
comes from the ecological Marxist critic, Andreas Malm, who criticizes Chakrabarty for 
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‘disconnecting climate change from issues of justice’.23 In Fossil Capital, Malm avers that ‘For 
the foreseeable future – indeed as long as there are class societies on earth – there will be 
lifeboats for the rich and privileged, and there will not be any shared sense of catastrophe.’24 
Counter to Chakrabarty’s belief in global solidarity through ecological devastation, 
Christian Parenti warns that deepening environmental crises are fuelling what he calls a 
‘politics of the armed lifeboat’ in wealthy, industrialized nations. According to Parenti, ‘armed 
lifeboat’ policies are characterized by ‘open-ended counterinsurgency, militarized borders, 
aggressive anti-immigrant policing, and a mainstream proliferation of right-wing 
xenophobia’.25 This analogy aligns with Mimi Sheller’s argument in Mobility Justice (2018) 
that climate catastrophe may contribute to the ‘narratives driving current politics’ which invest 
in ‘bolstering ethno-nationalist exclusion, hardening borders, strengthening energy 
independence, and competitive militarization’.26 The ‘armed lifeboat’ stance, then, provides a 
powerful counter-narrative to the isolationism underpinning lifeboat-nationalism while also 
foregrounding the durable disparities of wealth, military might, and the unequal access to 
resources that the ‘no lifeboats’ stance predicts will be flattened. Yet, Parenti also expresses a 
small but significant alignment with Chakrabarty regarding a ‘shared sense of catastrophe’, 
concluding that the ‘struggling states of the Global South cannot collapse without eventually 
taking wealthy economies with them’.27 Importantly for Parenti, then, the logic of pursuing a 
twinned approach of isolationism and inaction on climate change will mean that we are not all 
in the same boat but rather drowning in the same sea. 
 
The Wall and the armed lifeboat 
A post-climate change dispensation of ‘armed lifeboat’ nations is envisioned in John 
Lanchester’s Booker-longlisted dystopian novel, The Wall (2019). The narrative is set in 
Britain after a global event referred to only as ‘the Change’, where rising sea levels and 
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desertification have destroyed crops and beaches.28 These extreme ecological conditions have 
left most people ‘starving and drowning, dying and desperate’, but Britain has remained 
habitable.29 Focusing on a post-Change world in which Britain has surrounded itself with a 
concrete border, Lanchester’s narrative follows Joseph Kavanagh as he begins his conscripted 
two-year role on the Wall as a ‘Defender’. With little training beyond how to use a gun, this 
posting principally involves killing climate refugees – commonly referred to by the 
dehumanizing label of ‘Others’ – to prevent them from crossing the border. When Kavanagh’s 
unit are outnumbered and overrun by a flotilla of Others who manage to evade capture, he and 
his Defender partner, Hifa, bear partial responsibility and are exiled. Forced to exchange their 
‘lifeboat island’ for a real lifeboat, they join the multitude of Others seeking sanctuary on the 
open seas. 
While Lanchester’s speculative future is in line with Lovelock’s predictions regarding 
the habitability of temperate ‘lifeboat’ island-nations, the novel, as Kristen Sandrock notes, 
both stages and satirizes a prevailing ‘politics of isolationism’.30 For instance, Kavanagh 
describes how Britain’s immigration policy in the immediate years after the Change was ‘[o]ne 
in, one out: for every Other who got over the Wall, one Defender would be put to sea’.31 Here, 
Lanchester’s dystopian form is able to expose the cruel absurdity of an obsession with the 
‘carrying capacity’ of nation-states by taking it to its logical conclusion. Kavanagh notes that 
even this restrictive policy was regarded by the State as offering too much of an incentive, and 
so it was amended to give Others who crossed the border the option of ‘being euthenised, 
becoming Help or being put back to sea. […] Almost all of them choose to be Help’, a condition 
which amounts to slave-labour.32 Ultimately, then, alongside the militarization of Britain’s 
border, the dystopian parameters of The Wall call for limits on immigration to be combined 
with a choice between political disenfranchisement or the death penalty. 
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The State-sanctioned execution and subjugation of climate refugees is upheld by a 
social structure that is based on pre-existing inequities of wealth both nationally and 
internationally. This is a feature of The Wall’s dystopian world that sits in tension with the ‘no 
lifeboats’ position. Alongside reports of ‘countries breaking down’, Defenders hear of 
‘coordination between rich countries’ to forestall the arrival of Others.33 And where those 
safely located in rich, ecofascist states refer to the global watershed as ‘the Change’, the Others 
call it ‘the ending’: the stark contrast between the two points to the sense of managed, socio-
economic transition for the former and apocalyptic finality for the latter.34 The inequitable 
access to scarce resources also structures social relations within Britain, where only ‘members 
of the elite’ can use aviation fuel, allowing them to leave the country on private planes to ‘talk 
to other members of the elite about the Change and the Others and what to do about them’.35 
Despite this, Ben de Bruyn maintains that, because Kavanagh experiences life as an Other, the 
‘basic message of Lanchester’s novel’ is that ‘privileged citizens and irregular migrants are 
fundamentally similar, […] and climate change threatens to make environmental refugees of 
us all, with or without borders’.36 And yet, this is not strictly the case: Kavanagh and Hifa do 
not become ‘environmental refugees’ but rather exiles from a safe, functioning, ‘armed 
lifeboat’ society. Their precarity has not been caused because ecological breakdown has 
reached Britain’s shores, but because the lack of political or economic agency of lower-class 
conscripts means that they have no option but to be ‘depressed, resentful, apprehensive, bitterly 
doing the worst thing in your life’.37 And when Others breach the Wall, they have no power to 
appeal a ruling where the elites, whose planes contribute to the conditions of the Change, bear 
no accountability, while conscripts are forcibly expelled from their homes with little chance of 
survival. The fact that the State orchestrates a breeding programme ‘so that there are enough 
people to man the Wall’ ultimately suggests that this form of class exploitation, in tandem with 
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international collaboration between wealthy states and the persecution of refugees, shows little 
sign of abating.38 
The novel concludes with Kavanagh and Hifa building a new life together on a disused 
oil refinery, and it is here that we can see how a ‘shared sense of catastrophe’ is also forestalled 
by Lanchester’s inability to imagine a world beyond an anthropocentric control of fossil fuels. 
The refinery, as Sandrock argues, is symbolic of ‘the twofold history of Western imperialism 
and environmental destruction, both of which are causes of global migrancy and ongoing 
sources of border conflict around the world’. The fact that it is derelict leads Sandrock to 
conclude that the rig is also a ‘sign that the novel is exploring the beginning of the ending of 
Western modernity’s border epistemologies’.39 Similarly, De Bruyn argues that, because 
Kavanagh and Hifa are saved by the rig’s sole inhabitant (a conveniently mute and emaciated 
man), the novel’s conclusion suggests that ‘the idea of home has not been completely 
abandoned, and strangers will on occasion still make you feel “welcome”’.40 What these 
analyses neglect, however, is one of the novel’s final images, which may not dramatize a return 
to the politics of the ‘armed lifeboat’, but does reveal a failure to progress beyond the logic of 
the fossil fuel economy. As well as discovering a bounty of sustenance and ‘the complete works 
of Shakespeare’ at the refinery, Kavanagh finds working lanterns, matches, and a supply of oil:  
 
I wanted to shout, oil, oil, oil! Light and heat. In that moment I realised something. 
I had internalised the idea that I would never again have light and heat – would 
never have control of them, would never be able to make it bright or make it warm, 
just by deciding that’s what I wanted. An ordinary miracle, a thing we had done 
dozens, maybe hundreds of times a day all our lives before the sea, and which had 
then gone away forever, and now had come back. I felt something strange on my 
face and touched it and found that I was crying.41 




Kavanagh’s tearful cry of salvation at his ability to return to human control over the elements 
is not delivered with any degree of ironic distance, and despite his experience as an Other at 
sea, the novel ultimately fails to realize any sense of post-Change communal solidarity. Rather, 
his use of ‘we’ is instructive: it excludes the novel’s Others, whose access to energy sources 
has been violently restricted by Defenders like himself, and it discounts the fact that the oil 
Kavanagh jubilantly celebrates is the very combustible material that has led to a flooded planet. 
This miraculous final moment, then, encapsulates the limits of Lanchester’s dystopian tale of 
life after ecological breakdown: in The Wall it is possible to imagine the end of the world but 
not the end of fossil fuels.  
 
Ways beyond the nation-as-lifeboat: three Indigenous stories 
Despite their disparate geopolitical visions, the three ‘lifeboat’ analogies outlined above share 
a common rhetoric of precarity (whether it be universal or uneven) and an outward-looking 
concern with how nation-states respond to climate refugees crossing the border. This means 
that each analogy cannot fully attend to the impact of climate breakdown on domestic 
migration, or its exacerbation of the ongoing settler colonial power relations internal to nation-
states such as America, Canada, and Australia. In response, I will end with three Indigenous 
stories via the work of Kyle Whyte, Alexis Wright, and Robin Wall Kimmerer, each of which 
moves away from the universal/uneven instability implied by the nation-as-lifeboat analogies.  
In his ‘allegorical story of vessels’, the Potawatomi scholar, Kyle Whyte, offers a ‘way 
beyond the lifeboat’ that forges connections between the crises of settler colonialism, 
capitalism, and climate change.42 Whyte’s allegory presents a world of canoes, aircraft-carriers, 
and hovercrafts, all of which ‘are intricately connected to each other in various relations of 
interdependence’ via ‘power lines, bridges, ropes, shuttles and other materials’.43 The canoes 
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‘represent the many different Indigenous peoples everywhere and people who share their 
situation’.44 The traces of individual ‘boat-making style[s]’ emphasizes a pan-Indigenous 
precarity that resists homogeneity, while the ‘destroyed’ canoes that litter the seafloor 
symbolize the extermination of Indigenous societies due to the histories of settler colonialism. 
The occupants of canoes remain close to the water, where they can ‘observe firsthand trends in 
water quality and turbulence’. The aircraft-carriers, with their ‘high-technology equipment’ 
symbolize nation-states, a choice of imagery that has an affinity with Parenti’s formulation but 
without the implied sense of mutual instability. In contrast to the warnings of the ‘armed 
lifeboat’ position, moreover, Whyte emphasizes how diasporic settlement is associated with 
socio-economic inequality within wealthy nations, writing that ‘[s]ome people who were born 
on the canoes now live on the aircraft carriers, bringing with them shards of materials from the 
canoes that they often have to sell for food.’ These communities are ‘most exposed to the water’ 
and thus ‘more likely to be flooded’.45 The giant hovercrafts that ‘float above all the other 
vessels in the sky’, represent corporations that support damaged aircraft carriers while canoes 
are ‘tie[d] up […] like yoyos’ and smashed.46 
 The allegory envisions ecological breakdown as ‘turbulence’, which is created by the 
aircraft carrier engines and is intensified by ‘the giant fans of the hovercrafts’.47 While this 
turbulence affects all vessels, ‘the canoes bear the brunt’, causing some to 
 
sink completely into the water, their occupants escaping onto other canoes or, at 
times, onto aircraft carriers; others change their location in the water and detach 
from the aircraft carriers, in the process facing the onslaught of the disturbance 
caused by the hovercraft engines.48 
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In depicting the dilemma of having to turn towards corporations for survival despite the further 
disturbance this causes, Whyte’s symbolism aligns with Naomi Klein’s investigations into the 
‘economic pressure on Indigenous communities to make quick-and-dirty deals’ with the very 
extractive industries that are causing ecological damage: ‘This is the way the oil and gas 
industry holds on to power’, she writes, ‘by tossing temporary life rafts to the people it is 
drowning.’49 In  order to out-flank such ‘life raft’ deals, Klein affirms that non-Natives must 
commit to a relationship built upon reciprocity: as well as supporting the Indigenous land 
treaties that ‘represent some of the most robust tools available to prevent ecological crisis’, 
non-Natives must actively uphold Native self-determination with regards to health care, 
education, and economic opportunities.50 Similarly, Whyte’s allegory affirms that ‘[o]ne way 
to lessen the turbulence and storminess is to change the design of the aircraft carriers and 
hovercrafts completely.’51 Thus, the solution from ‘an Indigenous perspective on climate 
justice’ is not controls on migration or reproduction, but the systemic restructuring of society 
on equitable, anti-colonial grounds.52 
 Whyte’s allegory of vessels goes beyond the various lifeboat analogies in its insistence 
that precarity and exposure to the excesses of climate breakdown also apply to the poorest and 
most marginalized social groups within wealthy nation-states. It emphasizes how many of the 
characteristics of the ‘armed lifeboat’ – namely ethnonationalist exclusion and militarization – 
are pointed inwards to restrict the socio-economic agency of Indigenous communities, migrants 
(and their descendants), and refugees. As Todd Miller acknowledges, climate refugees who 
manage to cross national borders ‘find that the border operates not only around but within that 
entire country. It’s something they must cross not once but every day’.53 In The Swan Book, 
the Waanyi writer, Alexis Wright, goes further still in her depiction of the confluent, but not 
equivalent, experiences of climate refugees and Aboriginal Australians in a speculative future 
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that, much like The Wall, has been shaped by droughts, flooding, land wars, and mass global 
migration.  
The novel is set for the most part on a polluted, Army-run camp that detains both 
refugees from across flooded European nations and Aboriginal people. The white, European 
refugee, Bella Donna, describes how the rich escaped flood-hit regions by ‘flying off in 
armadas of planes’, leaving the ‘poverty people’ like herself to ‘walk herdlike, cursed from one 
border to another’.54 Yet, while there may be a shared sense of catastrophe among the poor, the 
European refugees’ recent experiences of climate-induced land loss are confronted by the 
history of settler colonial land appropriation: the refugees engage in ‘lamenting conversation’ 
about which nations were lost to flooding and wars, while the Aboriginal Australians ‘already 
knew what it was like to lose Country’.55 For the latter, this loss is experienced not only in 
terms of territorial displacement but also in forms of epistemic violence whereby the settler-
colonial State owns ‘every line of buried song, stories, feelings, the sound of their voices, and 
every word spoken loudly on this place now’.56 As such, Wright makes it clear that, for much 
of the Global North and many of the descendants of settlers in the Global South, the apocalyptic 
effects of human-induced climate catastrophe are thought of as being just over the horizon. 
Yet, as Kathryn Yusoff has noted, ‘imperialism and ongoing (settler) colonialisms have been 
ending worlds for as long as they have been in existence’.57 
The domestic precarity and historical exposure to militarized restrictions experienced 
by Aboriginal Australians is emphasized by Wright’s deployment of vessel imagery. In The 
Wall, Lanchester shows the transition from safety inside Britain’s borders to the insecurity of 
the raft at sea. By comparison, The Swan Book depicts life on dry land, but without the assumed 
security that such a condition suggests. Rather, the detention centre is located on a swamp 
littered with dilapidated ‘military ships and vessels that had once been used by commandos, 
militants, militia, pirates, people sellers, cults, [and] refugees’.58  Oblivia and Bella Donna 
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make a home together in the ‘rusting hull’ of a ship ‘with a long war record of stalking 
oceans’.59 In this way, Wright’s vessels symbolize a history of piratical colonial expansion, 
displacement, and slavery, within which the provisional family unit of the orphaned Oblivia 
and the stateless Bella Donna must make a home. Despite being land-locked, this home carries 
a level of insecurity commensurate with Kavanagh’s life on the raft. This condition is 
underscored when the Aboriginal prime minister, Warren Finch, orders the evacuation, 
dredging, and ‘annihilation’ of the camp having decided that its inhabitants ‘had given up the 
right to sovereignty over their lives’.60 
The divergence between The Wall and The Swan Book is also revealed in their final 
reflections on the implied futures of life on a flooded, warming planet. In the former, the 
potential for future survival is contained within Kavanagh and Hifa’s relationship and their 
renewed ability to use oil to control light and heat. In the latter, Oblivia does not forge a new 
union under catastrophic conditions. Her arranged marriage to Finch is curtailed by his 
assassination, leading her back to what remains of the swamp where ‘[h]er mind was only a 
lonely mansion for the stories of extinction’.61 Kavanagh’s discovery of the complete works of 
Shakespeare, moreover, points to Lanchester’s suggestion that a connection to Britain’s 
cultural heritage can survive ecological disaster, and his conservative message that canonical 
literature is the foundation of a post-Change society. By comparison, those escaping the 
superstorms that have flooded Australia’s urban cities in The Swan Book are forced to abandon 
their ‘treasured belongings’, including ‘Shakespeare’s sonnets’, and ‘books of philosophy 
[and] music’, as well as ‘electronics, [and] cartons of beer’.62 In Wright’s dystopic vision, then, 
the struggle for survival renders both high and low culture ephemeral, and Western high art 
ultimately shares the fate of the already ‘buried’ Aboriginal songs and stories. 
As well as dramatizing the uneven connections between climate refugees fleeing 
Europe, domestic refugees fleeing flooded cities, and the historical decimation of Indigenous 
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cultures, Wright’s narrative makes it clear that human displacement is linked too with non-
human extinction and displacement. This is signalled by Oblivia’s communion with the swans 
that have also found a home among the disused vessels of the swamp. Following the destruction 
of their habitats due to anthropogenic drought and desertification, the swans had ‘become 
gypsies, searching the deserts for vast sheets of storm water’.63 Sensing an affinity with the 
birds, Oblivia knew ‘that the swan had been banished from wherever it should be singing its 
stories and was searching for its soul in her’.64 The novel’s epilogue sees Oblivia return to the 
swamp, where she sits on the hull of her old warship cradling the single-surviving black swan. 
This image holds two provisional futures in play at the same time. On the one hand, it acts as 
an interspecies pietà symbolizing human compassion for the more-than-human world along 
with the possibility of redemption and rebirth. Yet, at the same time, Wright resists imbuing 
either Oblivia or the swan with the burden of a hopeful futurity. Although Adelle L. Sefton-
Rowston maintains that ‘the swans […] represent the textual theme of hope’, Wright’s narrator 
insists that the last remaining swan ‘was not interested in saving the world’.65 And when the 
spectre of the ‘drought woman’ tells Oblivia, ‘You have to carry the swan’, Oblivia ‘thought 
she was being put upon by some proper big dependency that was now far too much for her’.66 
This conclusion may suggest an alignment with Lovelock’s fatalism, but Wright’s deployment 
of the dystopian form, as Allison Mackey argues, offers ‘an alternative to the sense of doomed 
temporality’ that accompanies other accounts of ecological catastrophe. Avoiding both the 
fatalism of Lovelock and the jubilant catharsis of Lanchester, Oblivia’s kinship with and 
uneasy stewardship of the swans suggests instead that ‘negative emotions such as guilt and 
remorse might play potentially productive roles in the possibility of radical hope’.67 
Wright’s image of Oblivia nursing the dying black swan brings me to my final example 
of Indigenous storytelling that moves us away from the nation-as-lifeboat analogy and towards 
an ecocentric vision of climate justice. In Braiding Sweetgrass (2013), the Potawatomi botanist, 
‘Postcolonial Futures’, Moving Worlds  Matthew Whittle 
17 
 
Robin Wall Kimmerer, recounts the Native creation story of Skywoman falling towards a body 
of water and being caught by non-human animals, who proceed to create the land upon which 
humans can live. As Kimmerer puts it, ‘From the very beginning of the world the other species 
were a lifeboat for the people. Now, we must be theirs.’68 The lifeboat symbolism here is rooted 
in the Great Lakes, the world’s largest group of freshwater lakes and the ancestral home of the 
Potawatomi nation. As this is a body of water through which the US-Canada border runs, 
Kimmerer’s retelling of this myth encapsulates the connection between international migration 
and climate breakdown. It is a lifeboat analogy about making inhospitable environments 
hospitable in a manner that works across both the national boundaries forged by settler 




It is often assumed that responses to climate breakdown are the preserve of the Left, while the 
Right is dominated by a denial that favours the extractivist status quo. This is true only to a 
point. As this article has shown, across the Global North, governments are resisting systemic 
changes to the very industries causing global warming and biodiversity loss while responding 
to climate crisis-induced migration by policing the movement of people seeking sanctuary. 
‘[R]ather than recognizing that we owe a debt to migrants forced to flee their lands as a result 
of our actions (and inactions)’, warns Klein, the governments of the Global North ‘will build 
ever more high-tech fortresses and adopt even more draconian anti-immigration laws’.69 And 
according to Miller, the ‘colonial lines of division’ defining contemporary nation-states are one 
of the primary legacies of imperialism that work ‘against survival in the crises of the living 
planet’.70 At this perilous moment in the history of the planet, postcolonial analysis is able to  
challenge dominant ‘lifeboat’ discourses that use climate breakdown to justify the restriction 
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of human rights pertaining especially to women, the poor, Indigenous peoples, and people with 
disabilities. Countering such ecofascist responses to global warming means, firstly, including 
pan-Indigenous forms of science and storytelling in environmental discourses, and, secondly, 
aligning postcolonialism’s long-standing ethical and intellectual preoccupation with global 
mobility to a vision of climate justice that frames ecological survival in anti-colonial and anti-
capitalist terms. In short, we must commit to making the land, water, and air equitably 
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